Workflows capture complex operational processes and include security constraints limiting which users can perform which tasks. An improper security policy may prevent certain tasks being assigned and may force a policy violation. Deciding whether a valid user-task assignment exists for a given policy is known to be extremely complex, especially when considering user unavailability (known as the resiliency problem). Therefore tools are required that allow automatic evaluation of workflow resiliency. Modelling well defined workflows is fairly straightforward, however user availability can be modelled in multiple ways for the same workflow. Correct choice of model is a complex yet necessary concern as it has a major impact on the calculated resiliency. We describe a number of user availability models and their encoding in the model checker PRISM, used to evaluate resiliency. We also show how model choice can affect resiliency computation in terms of its value, memory and CPU time.
INTRODUCTION
Workflows capture the logical processes of achieving business goals and are used in almost all business domains including finance, healthcare and eScience [5, 9, 12] . Although the definition of what a workflow is may vary within these Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. domains, a workflow typically consists of atomic tasks (the work) that are logically ordered (the flow) to produce the required outcome [1] .
Tasks must be assigned to users in order to be performed, often in-line with business rules and regulatory requirements defined within a workflow security policy [3] . A policy can limit task execution only to qualified users and limit access to (often) sensitive information which is needed by a user during the course of their duties. Workflow policies typically come with three main constraints 1) user-task permissions stating which users can perform which tasks; 2) separation of duties stating which tasks must be performed by distinct users to limit fraud and error [7] ; 3) binding of duties stating tasks that must be performed by the same user providing consistency and limiting the dissemination of information across multiple tasks [14] .
A workflow security policy designer is tasked with defining a policy that not only meets all business security requirements but also allows the workflow to proceed to completion without hindrance [4, 15] . In practice this exercise is often not trivial in light of limited user numbers, large workflows and complex security requirements. Finding an assignment of users to tasks that allows a workflow to finish without being forced to terminate early or violate its security policy deems the workflow as satisfiable. It is the job of the policy designer to ensure such an assignment exists as an outcome of their drafted policy. Solving this problem, known as the workflow satisfiablility problem (WSP) is an ongoing research problem and is well studied in the literature [8, 20] . The WSP has been shown to be NP-hard meaning every combination of users to tasks may have to be tried before finding an assignment which satisfies a workflow.
The WSP is all well and good if one assumes users will always be available. If this is the case, a satisfiable workflow will always complete in every instance. However in practice, users become unavailable due to a number of reasons some of which may be unforeseen, e.g. preoccupation or sickness. It follows that a satisfiable workflow before execution may become unsatisfiable during its operation. The workflow resiliency problem extends the WSP by finding an assignment if one exists, to satisfy a given workflow under an assumption that some users may become unavailable.
Availability is usually defined in terms of up-time. That is, states of a system are labelled either up or down, and the fraction of time in the states labelled up corresponds to the system's availability. In [19] , Meyer and Sanders provide a general approach to the definition of metrics such as this. In this paper we discuss a more specific notion of availability, namely the availability of users, which can be present or not.
User unavailability in workflows was introduced by Wang and Li [20] , who considered a qualitative approach where users are either available or not. A workflow is classified as k resilient if the workflow can still be satisfied regardless of which k users become absent. Mace et al [17] considered a more quantitative approach by assigning probabilities to users becoming absent. Calculating the resiliency of a workflow was shown to be equivalent to finding the optimal policy of a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [6] . This approach is practical in the sense it provides a level of resiliency (success rate) to workflows that must work but cannot be made fully resilient in every case.
It is useful then to provide tools and methodologies to workflow security policy designers enabling them to automatically calculate the resiliency offered by a workflow security policy. Such tools can be beneficial in a number of ways, they can 1) enable policy comparability in terms of workflow resiliency; 2) identify resiliency changes following policy modifications; 3) ensure a policy provides the minimum requirement of resiliency; 4) highlight extra user level requirements, and unworkable processes and policies; 5) provide resiliency indicators and assurance to business leaders and process designers;
A well defined workflow consisting of ordered tasks and users constrained by a security policy is fairly straightforward to model [8, 17] . On the other hand, capturing user availability in a model relies on, and is only as good as, the availability inputs provided by the environment. This may for example involve users with non-deterministic or probabilistic availabilities for workflow tasks. Depending on the information available and other contextual inputs, a user availability model could be defined in multiple ways for the same workflow. Making the correct choice of model becomes a complex yet necessary issue as it has a major impact on the resiliency calculated for a workflow. A poor choice may result in a flawed and misleading resiliency value.
In this paper we model workflows and user availability using the model checking tool PRISM [16] which is able to calculate the resiliency of workflows modelled as MDPs. We do not state which choice of availability model to take but instead explore PRISM's capability to encode a variety of user models containing non-deterministic and probabilistic availabilities. We also show how model choice can impact resiliency computation, not only in terms of the resiliency value but also in terms of memory and CPU time.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of related work, Section 3 discusses the workflow satisfiability problem whilst Section 4 describes workflow resiliency. Section 5 discusses encoding workflows and user availability in PRISM, Section 6 provides analysis of how the choice between user availability models affects resiliency computation, whilst concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
Model checking has been used by Armando et al. [2] to formally model and automatically analyse security constrained business processes to ensure they meet given security properties. He et al. in [10] also use modelling techniques to analyse security constraint impact in terms of computational time and resources on workflow execution.
Herbert et al. in [11] [18] which under uncertainty, aims to optimise the decision process for a sequence of access requests. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no current literature on the impact user availability model choice can have on the automatic analysis of workflow resiliency, which is the focus of this paper.
WORKFLOW SATISFIABILITY
In this section we give a simple workflow definition before describing the process of assigning users to tasks whilst meeting security constraints, known as the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP).
Workflow
In the literature a workflow commonly consists of a partially ordered set of tasks (T, <), such that for any two tasks t, t ∈ T , if t < t then t must be performed before t in any instance of the workflow [8, 20] . Running example. As a running example to illustrate the different concepts presented here, we consider a simple workflow shown in Figure 1 where T = {t1, t2, t3} and t1 < t2 < t3, meaning the only valid execution sequence is t1, t2, t3 . Next we define a set of users U that comes with a security policy over the set of tasks T . In general, a security policy is a triple p = (P, S, B) where:
• P ⊆ U ×T are user-task permissions, such that (u, t) ∈ P if, and only if u is allowed to perform t.
• S ⊆ T × T are separations of duty, such that (t, t ) ∈ S if, and only if the users assigned to t and t are distinct.
• B ⊆ T × T are bindings of duty, such that (t, t ) ∈ B if, and only if the same user is assigned to t and t . Running example. We now consider a set of users U = {u1, u2, u3} and a security policy p1 = (P1, S1, B1) that states: Figure 1 illustrates p1, where the dotted arrows signify the constraints given in S1. A label [um, ..., un] states the users that are authorised by P1 to execute ti.
Definition 1 (Workflow).
A workflow is a tuple w = ((T, <), U, p), where T is a partially ordered set of tasks, U is a set of users, and p is a security policy.
Assignment
A workflow assignment is a relation A ⊆ U × T , such that (ui, ti) ∈ A is a user-task assignment indicating ui is assigned to ti. Informally, any A is valid if a) task ordering is A given assignment A is complete if it includes a usertask assignment for every task in the workflow, or partial otherwise. The WSP therefore consists of finding an assignment A that is both valid and complete which we denote as A W SP . In general the WSP has been shown to be NP-hard, in other words, all possible user-task assignments may have to be checked to solve it [20] .
Imagine we want to find A W SP for our running example and begin by assigning u1 to t1 and u3 to t2 to form the partial assignment A = {(u1, t1), (u3, t2)}. Although this assignment is valid, there is no u ∈ U such that A ∪ {(u, t3)} W SP , meaning the workflow cannot finish correctly. However, with the partial assignment {(u1, t1), (u2, t2)}, we can add (u3, t3) to form a complete and valid assignment.
Quantitative Satisfaction
In [17] , Mace et al took a quantitative approach by showing the solution to the WSP is equivalent to finding the optimal policy of a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [6] . The MDP presented is based on the state transition diagram shown in Figure 2 , which depicts an abstracted view of a workflow assignment process. Each node represents one of four system states read as follows: 1) ready to select usertask assignment; 2) ready to check user-task assignment satisfies policy; 3) policy checked; 4) workflow terminated.
Each directed arrow between two states s and s indicates a transition from s to s . The five transitions are read as:
• step: get the next workflow task t and a perspective user u to assign to t • check: check assignment (u, t) satisfies security policy • assign: (u, t) satisfies security policy • fail: (u, t) does not satisfy security policy • finish: no more tasks to assign Solving the MDP involves calculating the optimal value function on every possible state. Roughly speaking, the MDP takes the transition step for each u ∈ U and next task t, assigning the user to t who maximises the expected reward collected by the process. The value function returns a reward of 1 if there exists A W SP , or 0 otherwise.
WORKFLOW RESILIENCY
Solving the WSP assumes users will always be available for future tasks, however in practice, sickness, vacation, heavy workloads, etc., can cause users to fail. It is important to take this into account when finding A W SP for a given workflow. This is called the resiliency problem, whether a workflow can be satisfied even when some users become absent.
It may be the case that selecting a user-task assignment leads to a situation where all valid users for a future task will have failed or have a low probability of availability. To give a flavour for this, in our running example we choose A = {(u1, t1), (u2, t2), (u3, t3)} W SP . However, imagine u3 has a very high probability of failing at or before t3, observed from previous workflow logs. If u3 does fail, t3 cannot be reassigned to any other user meaning the workflow cannot finish. If we chose a different assignment A = {(u2, t1), (u2, t2), (u3, t3)} W SP , intuitively the workflow is more resilient as t3 can be reassigned to u1 and still finish if u3 did indeed fail.
Quantitative Resiliency
Wang and Li defined an approach to calculate a valid assignment if one exists, that is resilient to up to k users failing, in other words declaring a workflow to be either k resilient or not [20] . In many cases, finding an assignment for a workflow that is resilient to every combination of k user failures may be impossible, yet the workflow must still work. Yet finding a valid assignment that is resilient in 9 out of 10 cases is better than choosing a valid assignment that is resilient in only 1 out of 10 cases. In [17] , Mace et al extend their approach by introducing probabilistic user failures and show that computing the optimal policy of an MDP is equivalent to finding A W SP that maximises the value function. The value function returns 0 > v ≤ 1 if there exists A W SP where v indicates the probability of the workflow to finish, or 0 otherwise.
User Availability
Understanding when users will and will not be available is an obvious requirement when calculating resiliency, which may be deduced from a mixture of operational logs, behavioural analysis and user submissions (known and tentative absences). Another influential aspect is how the unavailability of users is modelled in the corresponding MDP.
Introducing user availability into the MDP involves updating the transition step shown in Figure 2 to include setting the availability of the user, based on some given probability. Transition step is now read as:
• step: get the next workflow task t, a perspective user u to assign to t, and the availability of u. The MDP arrives at state 2 with the next task and a perspective user to be assigned, who is either available of not available. As the MDP takes the transition step for each user, it follows availability must be set for all u ∈ U .
Availability Models
In [20] , Wang and Li introduce three categories of resiliency, each using a different availability model: static resiliency, where users can only fail before the start of the workflow; decremental resiliency, where users can fail during the workflow, and cannot become available again; and dynamic resiliency, where users can fail and later become available during the workflow. These three resiliency categories form the basis of the work in [17] which predominately focuses on the decremental model.
Two main modelling approaches can be considered; the first simplistic approach consists of encapsulating the availability of all users for every task as a whole such that every user is given the same availability probability; the second, more complex approach consists of considering users individually such that different availability probabilities can be applied to each user. We focus on the latter approach unless stated otherwise.
We now consider a non-exhaustive number of ways a user's availability can be modelled, ranging from simple non-deterministic models to more complex models involving dependent user failure probabilities. Selecting which model to use may be dependent on the environment and user availability data such that the most accurate model possible can be chosen, or it could be a trade-off between high accuracy and fast computation. For ease of identification throughout the rest of this paper each availability model of interest is labelled ami.
Non-deterministic Models
It may be the case that the availability of a user for a task is simply unknown, or non-deterministic. Therefore the availability of a user can be considered as binary, they are either available of not for a given user-task assignment. To effect a dynamic model (am1), a user's availability is either true (available) or false (unavailable) for each task. In our running example the availability for u3 may, for example be true for t1, false for t2 and true for t3.
Recording the current availability of a user allows a decremental model to be established (am2). If a user is unavailable for a task t they will remain unavailable for each remaining task t in the workflow, where t < t . In our running example, the availability for u3 to be true for t1, false for t2 and false for t3 corresponds to a valid decremental model. A static availability model (am3) can be established by noting the current task. If no task has been selected (the workflow has not started), the availability of a user may be set as true or false. Once the first task t1 has been selected, if the availability of a user is true it remains true for the entire workflow, if it is false it remains false. In our running example, the availability for u3 to be true for t1, true for t2 and true for t3 corresponds to a valid static model.
Probabilistic Models
It may be the case that some probability of availability can be applied to a user based, for example, on previous workflow logs and behavioural analysis. The most simple probabilistic model is to derive a single probability applied to every user for every task. However such an approach is likely to be impractical and provide little value.
A more complex variation (am4) is to state a different probabilistic availability for each user which is applicable to all tasks in the workflow. In our running example, u1 may have a probabilistic availability of 0.96 for t1, t2 and t3, u2 may have a probabilistic availability of 0.75 for t1, t2 and t3, and so on. Another possibility (am5) is to state a different probabilistic availability for each task in the workflow which is applicable to all users. This is equivalent to saying any user u has the probabilistic availability p for task t. In our running example, u1, u2 and u3 may have a probabilistic availability of 0.98 for t1, 0.78 for t2 and 0.93 for t3.
A further variation (am6) is to apply a different probability for each user to be available for each task. In our running example, u1 may have a probabilistic availability of 0.85 for t1, 0.97 for t2 and 0.64 for t3, u2 may have a probabilistic availability of 1 for t1, 0.98 for t2 and 0.86 for t3, and so on. Notice how the probabilistic models introduced so far have independent probabilities. Note also that the models discussed in this section could be dynamic, decremental or static as described in Section 4.3.1.
We now consider more dependent probabilistic availability models. The first (am7) considers the current availability of a user such that a user may have a different probability of availability if currently available to one if currently unavailable. In our running example, if u3 was available for t2 their probability of being available for the next task t3 may be 0.98, whereas if u3 was unavailable for t2 their probability of being available for t3 may only be 0.3.
Similarly, availability of a user u may depend on the current availability of another user u (am8) or a combination of both u and u (am9). Many other more complex variations can also be imagined involving combinations of current user availabilities, current task and the historic availability of previous tasks.
Bounded Models
It could be desirable and more realistic allowing only a proportion of users to fail rather than allowing the unlikely possibility of every user failing. A bounded decremental model (am10) introduces a threshold k to limit the maximum number of users failing during the operation of a workflow, similar to [20] . This means at least |U | − k users will always be available for a task, although they may not be authorised to perform it. The threshold k may for example be the observed average number of users failing across all previous instances of a workflow.
Such a model must consider all possible failures of up to k users. For example, all k users may become unavailable at the same point or at different points in the workflow. Being decremental in nature, once a user is unavailable they remain so for the rest of the workflow. In our running example, imagine k=2 such that up to 2 users may become unavailable. User u2 being available throughout the workflow whilst u1 failing at t2 and u3 failing at t3 would be one valid user failure case for am10, as would u1 being available throughout whilst u2 and u3 both fail at t2. The cases where only one or even no users fail would be valid for k=2 whereas all three users failing would not.
A more dynamic model am11 can be defined by applying a threshold k to each task, in other words up to k users may become unavailable for a task independent of previous user failures. This model is dynamic in the sense that a user who has failed for task t may become available for the next task t .
WORKFLOW MODELLING
There are many ways to solve an MDP including dynamic programming (e.g. value iteration) [13] . This technique is provided by the probabilistic model checking tool PRISM, which enables the specification, construction and analysis of probabilistic models such as MDPs [16] . PRISM is an intuitive choice as it can model both probabilistic and nondeterministic choice, and gives an efficient way to solve an MDP whilst providing analysis data regarding computation overheads.
Prism Modelling Language
A PRISM model definition constitutes a number of interactive modules that contain one or more local variables and commands as follows: The behaviour of a module is described through a set of local commands. Each command contains a guard and one or more probabilistic updates, taking the form:
A guard is a predicate over both local variables and those contained in other modules. If a command's guard equates to true, the guard's corresponding updates take place assigning one or more local variables with new values. The probability of update1 is prob1 and so forth such that the sum of prob1 to probn is 1. Only one of the updates will take place with its given probability assuming the guard is true. If a command contains only one update with probability 1, the probability value can be omitted. Updating variables is equivalent to a state transition causing the model to move from its current state to a new state. Given a variable i an update is defined in PRISM as ( i '=x) where x is the new value assigned to i .
Labelling commands across modules with a common label allows those commands to be synchronised such that a transition consists of all these commands operating in parallel. Such a transition will only occur when the guards of all its constituent commands equate to true. A guard of the form true is an empty guard that always equates to true; commands with such a guard are used to update local variables regardless of their current value. These commands can still be synchronised with others through labelling. A module containing several commands whose guards all equate to true will make a non-deterministic choice over which command to perform:
Named expressions or formulas can be included in a PRISM model to avoid the duplication of code and reduce the state space. Essentially a formula's expression can be substituted by its name wherever the expression would be expected.
formula name = expression;
Workflow Encoding
We provide a PRISM encoding of our running example in Appendix A. Note we use the variable t to indicate the current task where t=0 indicates the workflow has not started (no task has been selected), and t=−1 indicates the workflow has terminated. The Boolean variable fail is set to true if a user violates the security policy or is unavailable, or false otherwise.
Probabilistic model verification can be performed automatically by PRISM to analyse properties defined in temporal logic. In terms of satisfiability we require PRISM to calculate the maximum probability that a workflow will terminate such that all tasks are assigned and all constraints satisfied. This satisfiability property is defined in PRISM as:
Pmax=? [ F (t=−1) & (!fail) ]
where: Pmax =? asks PRISM to find the maximal probability of the formula in between brackets to be true; the operator F is the "Eventually" operator, i.e., F p is true if the statement p eventually holds in the system. In this case, we ask PRISM to find the maximal property so that, eventually, the termination point has been reached, (t=−1) and the workflow has not failed, (! fail ). This probability is between 1 or 0, indicating the resiliency of the workflow.
Availability Encoding
In this section we examine PRISM's capability of modelling user availability by encoding the models ami discussed in Section 4.3. Unless stated otherwise, user availability for each ui ∈ U is encapsulated in a distinct module named u i . The availability of ui for each task in the workflow is assigned by a PRISM command labelled [ s ] , synchronised to occur in the [s] transition shown in Figure 2 . If more than one [ s ] command is defined for each user, only one will execute dependant on its guard equating to true.
Non-deterministic Encodings
As the availability of a user ui is considered a binary property, a single boolean f i is set to true if ui is available of false if not. The non-deterministic dynamic model am1 can be encoded as follows:
To encode the non-deterministic decremental model am2 we must ensure f i remains false if it is already false , as follows:
To encode the non-deterministic static model am3 we must ensure f i is only set before the first task (when t=0) and remains the same for every other task, as follows:
Probabilistic Encodings
To encode the probabilistic model am4 only one availability probability p is used for ui across all tasks. It follows that a single [ s ] command is required with an empty guard, as follows: module ui fi : bool init true;
[ s ] true → p:(fi'=true) + 1 − p:(fi'=false); endmodule In our running example, imagine u2 has a probability of 0.86 of being available for any task in the workflow. The corresponding availability module for u2 under model am4 would be as follows: module u2 f2 : bool init true;
[ s ] true → 0.86:( f2'=true) + 0.14: (f2'=false ) ; endmodule
The probabilistic models am5 and am6 can be encoded in the same way for each user ui, the difference is in the applied probabilities. In am5 the probabilistic availability pi for ti will be the same for all u ∈ U (|T | probabilities) whilst in am6 they may be different (up to |U | × |T | probabilities). In order to set a probabilistic availability before each task ti is assigned (tn being the last task), a separate command [ s ] is given for each ti, as follows: module ui fi : bool init true;
[ s ] t=0 → p:(fi'=true) + 1 − p:(fi'=false); . . .
[ s ] t=n − 1 →pn:(fi'=true) + 1 − pn:(fi'=false); endmodule The dependant probabilistic model am7 is encoded to allow for a different probabilistic availability to be set for user ui according to the current availability of ui. This is effected with two [ s ] commands, the first executes if ui is currently available (f i =true), the second executes otherwise. Note how the number of commands could be increased with more precise guards, such that the described behaviour can be implemented for each individual task. module ui fi : bool init true;
The dependant probabilistic model am8 allows for a different probabilistic availability to be set for user ui according to the current availability of another user uj. PRISM allows modules to read the status of variables in other modules (but not update them). In our encoding f j denotes the current availability of user uj. module ui fi : bool init true;
The dependant probabilistic model am9 is essentially a combination of am7 and am8, encoded as follows: module ui fi : bool init true;
Combined Encoding
PRISM's state-based language is powerful enough to model both non-deterministic and probabilistic user availability, allowing us to combine both into a single encoding. In our running example, imagine for u2 we have no foresight of their availability for t1 (non-deterministic), we predict a probabilistic availability of 0.86 for t2, we predict a probabilistic availability of 0.95 for t3 if u2 was available for t2, and a probabilistic availability of 0.65 for t3 if u2 was not available (failed) for t2. To clarify, the command [ s ] with the guard t=0 is setting the availability of u2 for the next task t1, t=1 for the next task t2, and so forth. An encoding of this would be as follows: module u2 f2 : bool init true; 
Bounded Encodings
It is not trivial to encode non-deterministic bounded failures in PRISM. Encoding the step [s] in Figure 2 involves synchronising all commands assigning the availability of all users, in other words all these commands execute in parallel. It is not possible to randomly limit the number of executed commands to k or < k if some users have already failed. For instance, in our running example we require at least 3 [ s ] commands to assign their availability. If we want only 2 at most users failing (i.e. k=2) it is not possible to allow either 1 or 2 commands to be executed in a non-deterministic way.
To encode am10 we explicitly state every possible user failure case within a single PRISM command [u] and assign a probability to each case such that their total is 1. The same decremental model is used in [17] where equal probabilities for each user failure case are applied. For simplicity we also consider an equiprobable model such that every combination of failures of up to k users has an equal chance of occurring. This means all failure cases must be evaluated when calculating workflow resiliency. In our encoding, the command [u] assigns all user availabilities before the first workflow task. This command can be imagined to be equivalent to a new transition labelled users, from a new state 5 to the existing state 1 shown in Figure 2 .
A variable f i initialised to 0, holds the step at which user ui fails. The value tn+1 indicates a user does not fail where n is the number of tasks in the workflow. For example, in our running example, the variable f1=4 can be read either as u1 does not fail or u1 does fail but at some point after the last task t3, which is of no consequence. Each possible failure case is represented as a vector which includes every user and their failure step. For instance, in the running example u1 failing at t2, u2 failing at t3 and user u3 not failing constitutes a single failure vector which is defined in PRISM as a distinct probabilistic update, where q is the number of all possible failure vectors: The command [u] combines all probabilistic updates to make an equiprobable choice over which failure vector to choose before updating each variable f i accordingly:
[u] true → 1/q : update1 + . . . + 1/q : updateq;
In our running example, imagine we consider all failures of up to 2 users (k = 2), creating 37 failure vectors. A single module availability is used to capture all user availability as follows: To assess the availability of the perspective user pu for a particular task t, the formula av is added to the model definition as follows:
For example, if the failure step of u1 is t3 (f1=3) it follows (pu=1 & t<f1) will be true when t=1 and t=2, in other words u1 is available up until t3. A further implementation change to encode am10 is to update the main module of the model definition given in Appendix A. This includes inclusion of a variable uf and command [u] as shown in Appendix B.
The more dynamic bounded model am11 can be encoded by simply changing the command label from [u] to [ s ] . The availability of each user is now assigned with up to k users failing for each task in the transition [s] in Figure 2 . Note the state 5 and transition users required for am10 is not required, nor are the changes to the main module given in Appendix B.
ANALYSIS
In this section we look at how the different user availability models previously described can affect resiliency computation, not only in terms of value but also in terms of complexity including model state space, memory and CPU time.
For our analysis we consider a larger workflow example shown in Figure 3 where T = {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5} and t1 < t2 < t3 < t5 and t1 < t4 < t5. It follows that three valid task execution sequences exist, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5 , t1, t2, t4, t3, t5 , and t1, t4, t2, t3, t5 . The workflow also comes with users U = {u1, u2, u3, u4}, and a security policy p2 = (P2, S2, B2) where:
We select for analysis the following availability models described in Section 4.3 and encoded in Section 5.3:
• am1 : dynamic, non-deterministic • am4 : dynamic, independent, probabilistic (simple)
• am6 : dynamic, independent, probabilistic (complex)
• am7 : dynamic, dependent, probabilistic • am10 : decremental, bounded (k=2), probabilistic • am11 : dynamic, bounded (k=2), probabilistic Each availability model encoding is used in turn with the workflow encoding given in Appendix A. The workflow resiliency is computed in PRISM using its default hybrid engine 1 run on a computing platform incorporating a 2.40Ghz i7-4500U Intel processor and 8GB RAM. The results generated are given in Table 1 .
Resiliency Analysis
Clearly changing the probability of a user being available is going to change the overall resiliency value calculated for a workflow. This applies to any probabilistic user availability model making an exact comparison in terms of the calculated resiliency value challenging. The availability models also vary in complexity, for example am1 is purely non-deterministic, am4 considers 4 probabilities, whilst am6 considers 20 probabilities.
Instead we place an arbitrary bounds of between 0.7 and 1 on the randomly generated probabilities for each availability model. This experiment is run 50 times per model and the averages taken. Bounding the probabilities ensures each model is using roughly similar values. Even with this check in place, the resiliency results in Table 1 exhibit a wide variation of between 100 and 17.65%. We do not suggest which is the best model to use for resiliency calculation but instead highlight that different model choices can impact the resulting value for the same workflow.
With the non-deterministic model am1 there will always be the possibility of a valid user being available for each task, thus a 100% resiliency value is achieved. This is arguably of little value in terms of resiliency analysis. However in terms of the WSP, it indicates the workflow is satisfiable.
Resiliency Complexity
In this section we compare resiliency complexity given by different availability models in terms of state space, computation time and memory. Such metrics are useful especially if runtime resiliency analysis is required. Of course, complexity metrics of this type will be somewhat dependent on the computing platform and model checker used. The complexity results given in Table 1 are placed under the following columns:
• States -total number of reachable states in the PRISM model • Transitions -total number of transitions between states • Build time -time to construct the model • Verify time -time to compute resiliency • Memory -total memory used to compute resiliency • File size -size of PRISM model file • Size on disk -amount of storage allocated by the OS for the PRISM file. In Table 1 we can see each of the unbounded availability models, am1, am4, am6 and am7 all result in the same sized model, i.e., same number of reachable states and number of transitions between states. It follows that they all have The bounded availability models am10 and am11 result in a large increase in the overall workflow model complexity. For example, the state space using am11 is comprised of 91232 states compared with 8530 states when using an unbounded availability model. Similarly, the number of transitions using am11 is 3949682 compared with 31321. This can be attributed to the explicit encoding of all possible user failure cases in these bounded availability models. The corresponding computation times, memory usage and storage size are also observed to increase in-line with the size of the workflow model.
CONCLUSION
We have reused the result in [17] which considers the workflow satisfiability problem as a decision problem, reduced to that of solving a Markov Decision Process (MDP). We have provided an encoding of workflows as probabilistic models and used the ability of the model checker PRISM to efficiently solve the resulting MDP. The workflow resiliency problem is also automatically solved following the introduction of several user availability models.
We have shown that user availability can be modelled in several ways for the same workflow, set of users and security policy making the correct choice of model a complex yet necessary concern due to its major impact on the computed resiliency value. It is important that a workflow security policy designer is provided with suitable values when assessing how resiliency would be impacted by a security policy. Appropriate resiliency values are also useful to ensure a policy provides the minimum requirement of resiliency; highlighting extra user level requirements, unworkable processes and policies; and in providing resiliency indicators and assurance to business leaders and process designers. We also show how model choice can impact resiliency computation in terms of memory and CPU time.
In terms of future work we look to analyse different sizes of workflow to understand how the complexity of computing resiliency scales and how the complexity metrics change. We also look to develop suitable tools and methodologies for workflow security policy designers enabling them to automatically calculate an appropriate resiliency value offered by a workflow security policy.
APPENDIX A. WORKFLOW ENCODING
Here we provide a PRISM encoding of our running example. Example encodings for the user availability modules u1, u2 and u3 are provided in Section 5.3. module main nt : bool init true; pc : bool init false ; fail : bool init false ; ... endmodule module u2 f2 : bool init true;
... endmodule module u3 f3 : bool init true;
... 
B. BOUNDED ENCODING
Here we provide a PRISM encoding of the main module when using the bounded user availability module described 
